T AND economics has long existed as an area of specialization within U agricultural economics although the efforts of land economists have extended beyond agricultural economics. Recently land economics has experienced a new wave of popularity and considerable activity is underway on natural resource-related investigation.
1
Yet land economics has come in for its share of professional criticism. Salter" found much of the research in the field unproductive. In his significant work on production economics, Heady" questioned the basic logic underlying land economics as an area of study. He conceded, however, that knowledge of "legal, historic and property rights aspects of resource tenure" is important.' T. W. Schultz has also had his say about land. He has not concerned himself about the content of a particular specialization within agricultural economics but rather has written extensively about the role of land in economic development," It was in this context that Schultz advanced his locational matrix hypothesis. Writing more recently, Haup" argued that economists have too long treated natural resources as being fixed in supply and have not recognized the importance .. Tech. paper 1970, Oregon Agr. Expt. Sta. Supported by grant WP-00107 of the U. S. Public Health Service.
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1 Land is used here in the classical sense and encompasses that part of the natural environment that is relevant from an economic point of view. Used in this way EMERY N. CASTLE is professor of agricultural economics, Oregon State University.
of increasing human knowledge and the effectiveness with which it is applied. This is quite consistent with Schultz' earlier writings on the subject. Milton Friedman says, There may still be some problems for which it is important to distinguish land from other resources, but for most problems it hardly seems important to do so. In most contexts now important, land, in any economically relevant sense, is indistinguishable from other forms of capital. The productive power of the soil can be produced at a cost by drainage, fertilization, and the like, and is clearly not permanent."
Despite these writings by respected economists, land economics has persisted and is growing more rapidly than the whole of agricultural economics. Surprisingly, there has been little serious effort made to answer the criticisms that have been made of the field or to provide any logic for the specialization beyond that of administrative convenience."
In this paper, the position is developed that there are some compelling reasons arising from the process of economic development and associated decisions for the longeVity of land economics. It is further contended that these reasons have not been clearly identified; the consequence has been that some of our research has not focused on problems faced by society. By identifying the root of the economic questions relative to natural resource management, a framework is provided for viewing such widely divergent efforts in land economics as the study of simulation techniques applied to river basin planning, and the examination of such economic institutions as water law and zoning ordinances."
After the rather ambitious objectives of the above paragraph, perhaps a there is no difference between land and natural resource economics. The emphasis is placed on traditional land economics problems in this country. The relation of land tenure issues to economic growth and problems of community development are not treated explicitly.
• Chicago, Aldine Publishing Co., 1962, pp. 199, 200. • An exception to the above statement is a recent note by Fredrick O. Sargent entitled "The Resource Allocation Process: A Distinguishing Characteristic of Land Economics," Land Econ., Vol. 40, August 1964, p. 315. • In preparing this paper I have had the benefit of reading an unpublished paper by Walter E. Chryst and W. B. Back entitled "Scope, Content and Methodological Problems of Land Economics." delimiting paragraph is now in order. It is not maintained that land economics deserves to grow or even that it should necessarily survive. The answer to such questions can be obtained only by comparing the productivity of intellectual effort in land economics with that of comparable effort in other areas. Such questions are important and should be asked; our objective, however, is more modest. In summary, this is not an attempt either to bury or to praise land economics but rather to make its natural life somewhat more pleasant and productive." Specifically, the paper has the following objectives:
1. To relate natural resource management to overall economic policy issues and decisions 2. To suggest a framework which may be helpful in judging the adequacy of institutions used in the allocation, transfer, and tenure of natural resources 3. To identify questions relevant to group decision making on land resource issues 4. To relate past and prospective research efforts to the first three objectives.
Natural Resources and the Market Mechanism
Milliman!' has argued that the market should be relied upon to a much greater extent in natural resource management. The purpose of this paper will not be served by debating this normative issue. But the underlying positive proposition that our economy has seen fit to rely upon many institutions other than the market for the management of natural resources does need to be established. This is the implicit assumption of Milliman's article.
In agriculture, public intervention in the factor markets is an old story. Although the literature on agricultural policy is preoccupied with commodity marketing and pricing programs, a case can be made that public policy pertaining to the factor markets is of equal or greater significance. We have followed a policy of abundance for every factor of production in agriculture. Public intervention has, on balance, made the inputs in agriculture more abundant than would have been the case if allocation had been left to the market. It is true, of course, that the abundance of certain commodities has led to land retirement programs but the impact of such action has been offset by reclamation and "conservation" activi-ties. The policy of abundance has been followed with capital (government-sponsored credit programs), labor (foreign labor, discouragement of unions for agriculture workers), management (agricultural education programs), and technology (government-sponsored research). The economist, of course, is aware of this deep and fundamental inconsistency in U. S. agricultural policy. Yet there have been only a few scattered research efforts to measure the extent and impact of the inconsistency; furthermore, only a relatively small number of citizens seem to be aware of it.
While government intervention in all of the agricultural factor markets has long existed, such intervention undoubtedly has been greater for land than for other factors when one views the entire economy. Public intervention ranges from complete socialization of certain natural resources to laws which permit certain property rights to be restricted or curtailed when property is transferred.v This public involvement is not likely to diminish in the future; in fact, most informed people believe even greater involvement is likely to occur.
This public participation has resulted in a large number of questions being posed to land economists that stem from "felt difficulty" situations. Had the market been relied upon and had it then achieved satisfactory results, the same kinds of questions would not have been raised. It is not surprising that many questions relating to land have been asked and that public funds have been made available to support systematic intellectual investigation of such questions. The past popularity of land economics can be at least partially explained on these grounds; such questions are likely to become relatively more important in the future. The market mechanism is put to a different kind of test as economic development proceeds, and the most desirable institutional alternatives also change.
Conceptual Considerations
The market mechanism, as a tool of natural resource management, has been abandoned in this country on pragmatic rather than doctrinaire grounds. The fact that both public and private activity prevail suggests a willingness to use either if the situation seems to warrant it. Yet the absence of preconceived ideas as to what institutional arrangement will prove superior is not the same as the absence of criteria which may be used to evaluate institutional arrangements. Indeed, the uniqueness of the economist's contribution is related directly to the extent that he has criteria which may be used to evaluate both market and nonmarket institutions without bias.
Specification of objectives is necessary for the evaluation of any mechanism. There has been a tendency to treat income distribution and resource allocation as separate issues in much work in economics. There is no doubt that both objectives are important in natural resource management. However, their separation for some purposes is questionable; it has been demonstrated that "optimum" resource allocation cannot be separated from a distribution of income consistent with a theoretical social optimum." Because both issues have historically been important in land economics, it is interesting to consider whether their separation has always been justified. In any case it is clear that both matters must be dealt with in the evaluation of institutions.
What appears to be needed are criteria against which a given situation may be judged to determine whether public or private decision making is more likely to lead to "desirable" results. The criteria need not be absolute, they need only supply a hypothesis rather than a final answer. The hypothesis wiII supply a base for empirical work but should not be used to anticipate the results of an investigation of an actual situation. Recent literature in general economies may be helpful in establishing such criteria.> It is beyond the scope of this paper to review in depth all of the relevant literature. Nevertheless an attempt will be made to identify those elements of this literature that are crucial to the matter at hand. Our search is for criteria useful in judging the adequacy of market or nonmarket institutions that may be used for natural resource management. Any such criteria must be capable of treating two important characteristics of natural resources which complicate their management. One such characteristic is the fact that natural resource use frequently gives rise to externalities. The other is the existence of indivisibilities.P 13 See F. M. Bator, "The Simple Analytics of Welfare Maximization," Am. Ecan. Rev., Vol. 47, March 1957, p. 39 , for a review. Buchanan and Tulloch in The Calculus af Consent, University of Michigan Press, 1962, p. 198 External economies and diseconomies have a long history in economics literature. An attempt is made here to outline some of the main considerations." Externalities, of course, may appear either in consumption or production, although there is symmetry between the treatment of the two."
We utilize production relationships to illustrate externalities:
where Y A is the output of producer A, Y B is the output of producer B, and X, X 2 • • • X n are inputs. Partial derivatives are helpful in defining externalities. When
<0 and or and external economies exist. If the inequality signs above go in opposite directions, external diseconomies prevail. All consuming and producing units are, of course, interdependent in a market sense. The distinguishing characteristics of the diseconomies being treated here is that they are nonpecuniary; they do not enter the decision-making framework through the stimuli provided by a decentralized pricing system. Externalities, of course, can go both ways. A's production may also be a variable in B's production. By the same token this type of interdependence may be reflected between production and consumption functions as well as benalities although he is certainly correct in his position in citing all three as being possible reasons for the failure of decentralized decision making. In this article we define externalities as being the same as Bator's first category of externalities, namely, ownership. Indivisibilities are the same as Bator's technical externalities. Public good externalities (Bator's terminology) are not treated separately here because it appears that the management conclusions which How from the treatment which follows would cover most of the land management problems which are likely to arise. In the event this is not the case, the treatment could be extended to COVer Bator's public goods. 11 A thorough review of the literature on external economies and diseconomies and a careful application of the theory to natural resource situations would be an exceedingly valuable addition to the literature of land economics. A companion review to identify the varied means of providing for externalities in the law would be of equal or greater value. For an excellent article in this tradition see L. M. 
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With the four decision-making units outlined above, the possibility of 12 external relationships exists.IS Physical interdependence is the main reason for the importance of externalities in the economics of land. Society has long been aware of externalities as they affect land management; the wide variety of institutional arrangements that have evolved to deal with them are testimony to this fact. As economic development proceeds, externalities become important in different contexts than was previously the case.
The traditional textbook case of pollution as an example of externalities is now assuming increased relevance. The producer who changes the quality of the natural environment may affect either the production or consumption function of others in a way that is not reflected by a system of relative prices. For example, the upstream polluter may affect the production function of the downstream commercial fisherman as well as the consumption function of the downstream sport fisherman. Air pollution provides another example. Neighborhood effects of land development as well as the intense utilization of the atmosphere which results in such external effects as the creation of "noise" provide other examples. The economics of quality of the environment is emerging as a problem of major importance. Even so, the land economist's traditional interest in zoning and water rights can be traced back to the same basic economic phenomena. The traditional land economist studied institutional techniques for handling the kinds of externalities that have long existed.
The difficulty of coming to grips with "quality" management stems not so much from the inability to discover a shadow price (although this may be a major undertaking) as from the development of an institutional ar-rangement that can generate and utilize such information. This kind of situation may be described by utilizing the information of equation (3):
where YA is the output of the downstream producer and Y R is the output of the upstream polluter. X, is the polluting material which results from B's output and enters A's production function against his will. In the above case, producer A is suffering an external dis economy. If C T is the cost of pollution control, and if aCT aYA --<--.P AI aY B
ex;
uncontrolled pollution will reduce the net social product. (We have abstracted here from decision-making costs which are introduced later.) If the inequality goes in the other direction, the value of the diseconomy does not warrant internalizing it. An equity problem exists in both cases, of course.
Other examples of physical interdependence may be found with common property resources. The oil pool, the ground water aquifer, and the ocean fishery all provide examples. When private ownership of natural resources prevail, the entrepreneur has a production function of the following form:
(6) (7) where X, is the natural resource. To maximize returns to X, he will
With a common property resource his production function is of the form:
and B has a function of the form:
and (10) Xn. + X nb = k.
For a social optimum each should take into consideration the effect of his action on the other. Unrestricted entry and decentralized pricing may lead to producing in Stage III for common property resources. Another characteristic of natural resources which is important in policy affairs is the existence of indivisibilities. When indivisibilities exist, the marginal social cost of usage will be zero over a wide range and any toll or price will tend to misallocate the output of the "lumpy" resources. In welfare economics jargon, lumpiness violates the convexity assumption. The ultimate result of decentralization will be private monopoly. It is probable that for fairly long periods in our history much outdoor recreation belonged to this category of externalities. It is also possible that this time has passed for some outdoor recreation and that some type of pricing would not necessarily lead to misallocation. The marginal social cost of use is no longer zero. Equilibrium in usage will be reached either by "crowding" which wiII result in a deterioration in the quality of the resource or by some form of price or nonprice rationing.
Because of space limitations, we cite only a few examples. Nevertheless, it appears the kinds of problems that have been illustrated are very common in land management. The variety of institutional arrangements that have emerged in response to problems of natural resource externalities and indivisibilities have already been noted. They are testimony to the pragmatism and imagination of man. They range from complete socialization to an essentially unregulated market. There are numerous examples of varying kinds of joint public and private participation in decision making. The results, however, are not equally satisfactory. We probably are operating in Stage IlIon the production function for the salmon fishery in the Pacific Northwest, which results from the failure to restrict entry. The quality of some of our outdoor recreational resources may be declining in an uneconomic fashion despite public ownership of many outdoor recreation resources.
Perhaps the most striking feature of the recent literature in general economics on externalities is the agreement which has emerged on the proposition there is no single institutional technique, centralized or decentralized, which is ideal in the management of externalities. Such techniques may range from private bargains (mergers) to government prohibition of certain activities to complete government ownership (socialization). The traditional approach of tax subsidy schemes may still have application although the problem is considerably more complex than Pigou originally believed it to be. co But the complexity of the theoretical problem and the variety of institutional forms existing and that might be developed provide opportunity and challenge for the economist. The search for gcneralization should go on but an intellectual basis for pragmatism exists. Doctrinaire prescription will become unattractive relative to empirical investigation. Certain elements have been identified, however, which both the generalist and the case investigator must take into consideration. Buchanan and Tulloch's analysis of decision-making costs becomes relevant." They point out that the costs of collective decision making with regard to externalities may well exceed the value of the external loss. If CD refers to decision-making costs of internalizing the diseconomy, then inequality (5) will read:
This condition must hold for a change in institutional arrangements to be economic. Decision-making costs will rise as the number of participants increase. Nevertheless it can be demonstrated that private bargains are less likely to be workable when the number of parties become large.
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This line of reasoning suggests that the economist has a key role to play in the design of institutions. Landlord-tenant relations, for example, have long commanded the attention of land economists. Their analyses of the issues have contributed substantially to our understanding of the bargaining processes and served to identify the types of institutions which facilitate internalizing the externalities in question. Because of the small number of people involved, collective decision making has not been required for stable decision-making patterns to develop. Land reform, of course, changes bargaining power and mayor may not involve collective bargaining with regard to contractual rent on land. Even so, it appears these kinds of issues lie at the heart of traditional land economics."
" op. cit., chap. 8. 0' Sec Wellisz, op. cit., p. 354 for a summary. "Time has not been entered into the above analysis. Furthermore. conservation
Research Issues
There arc many classifications of research efforts that would be consistent with the analysis of the previous section. It appears that relevant research efforts will need to come to grips with questions of the type listed below:
1. How can one best describe and evaluate the consequences of resources allocations, transfer, and tenure as brought about by alternative market and nonmarket institutions? 2. What criteria are to be used to judge the adequacy and performance of institutions used to allocate, transfer, and hold land resources? 3. Within any particular institutional complex what are the consequences of particular decisions?
How does one decide if the market mechanism is adequate or inadequate for a particular factor or product? The question is a loaded one. "Adequate" or "inadequate" in a relative rather than in an absolute sense implies that there is a superior alternative. It is not sufficient to compare the performance of either the market or a nonmarket mechanism against an "ideal," "optimum," or theoretical standard and conclude it is inappropriate for policy purpose;" Market "failure" in some abstract sense does not mean that a nonmarket alternative will not also fail in the same or in some other abstract sense. Conversely, it will not do to compare the results of public investment in water resources development with some theoretical ideal and conclude the market would have done better." Even so, an implicit assumption of benefit-cost analysis is that values from the economy can be used, with minor adjustment, as a standard for public performance. It has always seemed to this writer to be a very neat trick to be able to use the values from the economy as data for benefitcost analysis and then assume that the market was perhaps inadequate for the particular natural resource investment being considered;"
The existing theory of resource allocation is of value in outlining the conditions which should be met for maximum welfare. The absence of problems have always been important in land economics. A major conservation problem, however, has related to the adequacy of the market in achieving "conservation." Externalities over time become relevant in such matters. Even so, the matter is much too complex to treat here and has been treated thoroughly and adequately elsewhere. See S. V. Ciriacy-Wantrup, Resource Conservation Economics and Policies, infra .
. A superficial view of the institutions common in natural resource management suggests they cope rather well with certain kinds of externalities but really do not help much with others. It appears that third party effects have been very important in the development of water laws. It is even possible that they have been given more attention than their economic importance warrants. It is not valid, however, to conclude that these laws are inefficient unless third part effects are at least considered. Yet other externalities are provided for much less satisfactorily. Water and air pollution and common property resources such as fisheries and ground water have been cited as examples. The external effects associated with urban expansion provide many additional examples.
If one of the inadequacies of the decentralized market is in its failure to reflect externalities, then some technique is needed that will register the repercussion resulting from various economic decisions. The Leontief input-output technique is ideally suited to showing the second and third round effects of a change in a particular sector of the economy. There are two ways such techniques might be used. One would be to use the results as a direct tool of management. The other would be to diagnose the weaknesses and strengths of alternative institutional arrangements in reflecting costs and benefits throughout the economy in decision making. A study at Oregon State on the economics of water pollution control reflects an attempt to make this latter type of application of the technique." In view of the formidable problems involved and the rather substantial resources required, the indirect type of use has considerable appeal.
The ''bread and butter" work of land economists involves predicting the consequences of particular decisions within a particular institutional complex. Agency economists are working almost entirely in this area. It is here that the interesting work in simulation will have its greatest influence. Of course, the more imaginative and fundamental work will not accept institutions as fixed and will have an impact on the future of these social mechanisms. There is considerable research underway which attempts to estimate the extra-market values associated with outdoor Considerable research in land economics has been consistent with the analysis presented herein. Wantrup's classic book on conservation gives explicit recognition to those instances where private and public objectives in resource management may not coincide." He has suggested that greater attention be devoted to those instances where price signals fail to communicate the ends of society;" Mason bas written an excellent article in the same vein.>" Kneese's work on water quality gives explicit recognition to the problem and uses the basin-wide firm as a technique for internalizing diseconomies." Other examples could be cited.
Yet the treatment of externalities has not been a central part of traditional land economics. One searches in vain for a treatment of externalities in land economics texts.
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Authors of land economics texts seem to proceed on the assumption that there must be at least one chapter on economic principles. But, after tradition has been served, there is little subsequent application of such principles. Given the particular economic principles chosen for development, their decision to minimize their use is appropriate. Agricultural economists have apparently become so immersed in the internal workings of the theory of the firm that they have failed to study carefully the means by which the firm relates to its environment. In the absence of ex-ternal economies and diseconomies, this is done through the demand function for factors and the supply function for products. Even when we have given explicit recognition to supply we have often failed to recognize that the sum of the marginal cost curves will not necessarily equal the supply function for the industry. This results from failure to recognize the importance of pecuniary diseconomies. As noted earlier, nonpecuniary diseconomies are of primary importance in land economics. In land economics the relationship of the firm to the external world or its environment is the core of the problem. It is with such problems that society is constantly grappling. And it is the existence of such problems that accounts for the continuing popularity of land economics research. But whether land economists have really attempted to discover those relationships relevant to a solution of such problems is another matter. With the exception of the few such as Wantrup and others noted above, the record has not been particularly outstanding.
The same underlying factors also explain the preoccupation of land economists with institutions. Economic research on institutions has frequently been highly descriptive and has often seemed to have little relevance to the economic functions the institution is being called upon to perform. But the evaluation of institutions does require analytics; it is not a job to be undertaken with one's bare hands. To what can the land economist turn for help? A ready-made answer is not available but an adequate answer will require intellectual effort of the highest order. 35 The principles that are associated with the treatment of externalities and indivisibilities in the literature can be helpful in identifying those instances where nonmarket institutions may be appropriate." But it is not enough to reject the market; it must be replaced by something. The functions the market performs or fails to perform should be provided for by alternative institutions. We need to come to grips with questions of criteria for the evaluation of both market and nonmarket institutions. A study of this type which holds the prospect of being quite durable is Wantrup's article on water law." The production economics-oriented group in land economics has tended to concentrate too intensely on finn theory without being sufficiently concerned with how the firm related to its environment. At the other extreme, another group has industriously "We have reference to explicit treatment of such a question. As indicated above, these relationships have always been implicit in the work of land economists, ee It is recognized that the market is not an immutable institution. The performance of the market may vary widely depending upon the constraints and rules of the game within which it functions. Furthermore, it has been assumed that markets and other institutions are means rather than ends. To the extent particular institutions become ends in themselves, the above analysis will miss the mark. Smith and Emery N. Castle (eds.), Iowa State University Press, 1964, chap. 15. examined, compared, and described institutional devices for natural resource management without relating those institutions to the economic functions they must perform. Internal firm problems are farm management. Land economics must consider nonmarket institutions, but description and classification in the absence of an explicit theory is an obvious indication of immaturity.
Conclusions
This article suggests the literature on external economies, diseconomies, and indivisibilities may be useful in researching the market and nonmarket institutions which may be used for natural resource management. It is not suggested that this theory be used as a basis for searching for a utopian quantitative optimum as defined in modem welfare economies, it is rather that such theory may be useful in judging the adequacy of certain decision-making institutions. There is substantial difference in solving for an optimum and establishing a framework which will permit alternative lines of action to be evaluated in the decision-making process. The formulation also indicates that the motivation and findings of the traditional land economists with their emphasis on institutions are still appropriate. The approach suggested may be useful both to those who are attempting to apply quantitative techniques to land economics problems as well as to those who are studying the institutions that affect the management of land resources.
